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 1.  Introduction 
In democratic systems elections serve as an instrument with which citizens, by 
withholding their vote, can punish dishonest politicians and so bring down corrupt 
governments. However, studies examining the effect of scandals on electoral outcomes 
tend not to find any significant evidence for this, implying that in most cases malfeasant 
politicians will be re-elected
1
. These results have, on occasions, been interpreted to 
indicate a cultural acceptance of corruption, a hypothesis that considers some societies 
to be tolerant of such scandals.  
Yet, electoral outcomes, it should be recalled, are not only a reflection of who receives 
the votes but also of who turns out to vote. Once an election is called, individuals face 
the choice of a participation decision. Some citizens may react to corruption by 
abstaining, rather than by specifically withholding their electoral support for the accused 
incumbent. In such instances, scandals affect electoral outcomes in a much broader 
manner than just their direct impact on the incumbent’s vote share. Therefore, to 
identify the impact of the effects of corruption, voter turnout must also be taken into 
consideration.   
Corruption scandals can affect individuals’ participation decision either by mobilizing 
the electorate to go to the polls to punish/support the malfeasant politician – henceforth, 
the “mobilization effect”, or by dissuading them from voting given their disaffection 
with the democratic process – henceforth, the “disaffection effect”. Most studies to date 
focus on the aggregated impact of scandals on voter turnout without distinguishing 
between the mobilization and disaffection effects (Dominguez and McCann, 1998). 
Indeed, the extant literature presents ad hoc explanations of variations in turnout that do 
not reflect a prior strategy to identify these different effects. Hence, once the analysis is 
complete, the impact of either the mobilization or the disaffection effects cannot be 
differentiated. Moreover, the aggregate level data used in some studies (e.g., Stockemer, 
2013; Stockemer et al., 2013) represent an additional obstacle to determining the 
relative power of the two effects. 
The aim of this paper is to determine whether the participation of individuals at local 
elections is affected by a corruption scandal involving the incumbent. Drawing on data 
at the individual level, we are able to identify the mobilization and disaffection effects 
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 Peters and Welch (1980) and Welch and Hibbing (1997) show that US House of Representative 
members involved in scandals are more likely to be re-elected than not. For Brazilian mayors, Ferraz and 
Finan (2008) report a 10% fall in their probability of re-election, if municipalities are involved in random 
federal audits. In Spain, Rivero and Fernandez-Vazquez (2011) find that corruption has no effect on local 
election outcomes and Costas-Pérez et al. (2012) estimate a 3% vote loss after a corruption scandal is 
revealed. Chong et al. (2012) use an experimental setting in Mexico to show that information on 
corruption does not significantly affect an incumbent’s vote share, a similar result to that found for Brazil 
(Winters and Weitz-Shapiro, 2013). 
2
 that corruption may generate taking into consideration both the individual’s partisan 
leanings and the timing of the scandals.  
The likelihood of a citizen being mobilized to vote following an episode of scandal may 
depend on his or her partisan leanings. Those with strong political leanings tend to turn 
out at the polls to support their politicians regardless. Similarly, high degrees of 
partisanship appear to be a factor influencing the way in which some individuals 
evaluate corruption scandals (Rundquist et al., 1977; Anduiza et al., 2012). By contrast, 
individuals who vote only occasionally do not exhibit strong partisan attachments and 
are likely to be more sensitive to scandals (Chong et al., 2012). Thus, the degree of 
partisanship will play a crucial role in determining how citizens perceive accusations of 
corruption of the incumbent, and how they translate their perceptions into voter 
behaviour.  
The timing of scandals may also affect participation decisions differently. Recent cases 
of corruption are perhaps quite likely to mobilize voters, while more distant scandals 
may already be forgotten (Fair, 1978; Kramer, 1971). Additionally, the timing of the 
episode may also play a fundamental role in shaping faith in the democratic system. 
Repeated cases of corruption can generate wide scale disaffection with the electoral 
system among the politically alienated, who eventually stop participating in elections 
(Kostadinova, 2009).  
Here we examine the impact of corruption scandals at the local level in Spain, which 
constitutes a good setting in which to test their effects on electoral outcomes. The 
Spanish case combines a recent wave of scandals in local government, concentrated 
above all in the 2003 to 2007 term of office, with a significant number of municipalities 
that experienced recurring cases of corruption in two consecutive terms (1999 to 2003 
and 2003 to 2007). Our database of local corruption scandals allows us to verify if past, 
recent or repeated corruption cases have different impacts on voter turnout. In addition, 
we draw on a survey conducted in several Spanish municipalities (affected or otherwise 
by corruption scandals) that collects information on, among others, individual voting 
behaviour in the 2007 local elections, degree of partisanship, ideology, and perception 
of corruption
2
. The use of these survey data collected at the individual level permits us 
to analyse the mobilization and disaffection effects of corruption on turnout depending 
on the voters’ partisan leanings. 
The adoption of a matching strategy allows us to identify a valid control group for those 
municipalities affected by corruption. As well as selecting ‘twin’ municipalities that did 
not experience scandals in the period analysed, the strategy purports further advantages. 
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 We refer specifically to a matching sample and a survey designed by Solé-Ollé, A. and Sorribas-
Navarro, P. (2014) for the study “Does corruption erode trust in government? Evidence from a recent 
surge of local scandals in Spain”. 
3
 First, the use of a matched sample improves the identification of the effect of corruption 
scandals on voter turnout, balancing the distribution of the covariates in the two 
subsamples. Matching also increases the transparency of our research design, as 
described in more detail in section 3.2. We report a series of placebo tests that further 
confirm the validity of our identification strategy. 
Overall our results show that an episode of local corruption means citizens are, on 
average, 1.5% less likely to vote. However, not all individuals modify their electoral 
participation in response to a case of corruption in the same way. This study shows that 
partisan leanings play a key role in shaping individuals’ responses to corruption. We 
find that independent voters are 4.4% less likely to vote if a corruption scandal occurs in 
their municipalities. Core supporters, defined as those citizens who always vote for the 
same party, do not seem to react to corruption scandals, irrespective of whether they 
support the incumbent party or the opposition.  
We also find that when cases of corruption recur in a municipality over various periods, 
citizens are more likely to abstain. However, this effect disappears when the episodes 
are distant in time or in the period in the run-up to the election analysed.  
Taking both individuals’ partisan leanings and the timing of scandals into consideration, 
our results show that corruption only impacts the participation of independent voters. 
These individuals are also less likely to vote in municipalities that have experienced 
past or repeated cases of corruption, the latter being responsible for a 6.3% fall in their 
likelihood of voting. This implies, all in all, that the disaffection effect of scandals 
predominates over that of mobilization. 
We find that independent voters report higher perceptions of corruption after revelations 
of a scandal. By contrast, core supporters of an incumbent involved in a case of 
corruption seem to turn a blind eye to the scandal, while the corruption perception of 
core supporters of the opposition parties increases. We also find that in the short term 
local scandals affect corruption perceptions, but that they do not immediately affect 
individuals’ participation decisions.  
Our paper makes three significant contributions to the extant literature. First, our 
research strategy draws a necessary distinction between the ‘mobilization’ and 
‘disaffection’ effects of corruption on voter turnout. Second, this is the first paper, to the 
best of our knowledge, that empirically analyses how these two effects are influenced 
by partisan leanings. Thus, we identify the individuals that are potentially mobilized to 
vote, and those who withdraw from elections as a consequence of corruption scandals. 
Third, by testing the impact of episodes of corruption occurring at different times on 
voter turnout we are able to untangle conclusions drawn in earlier studies that did not 
differentiate voter responses on the basis of the timing of scandals.  
4
 Importantly, our study provides empirical evidence regarding the effects of actual 
corruption cases. Most empirical studies of the determinants and consequences of 
corruption rely on perceptions, which while being easier to obtain raise concerns as to 
both their bias and their accuracy. Moreover, we do not consider corruption at the 
aggregate level, but rather only at the local municipal level. Measuring corruption at this 
level provides us with a more extensive sample of cases. It also has the additional 
advantage that cases of corruption at this level are more easily linked in the minds of the 
citizens with the corresponding local politician, which potentially increases the 
accountability of municipal elections.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section explores the reasons why 
the timing of corruption and partisan leanings can affect turnout once a scandal becomes 
public, and it outlines the main hypotheses tested. Section 3 defines the empirical 
analysis undertaken here and the database used. Section 4 discusses the estimation 
strategy. Section 5 presents the results and, lastly, section 6 concludes. 
2.  The mobilization and disaffection effects of corruption 
2.1. Previous literature 
Neither the theoretical nor the empirical literature agrees on the exact relationship 
between corruption and voter turnout
3
. A major shortcoming of this existing literature is 
the lack of an empirical strategy for identifying the effects of a scandal, be it an increase 
in electoral participation through the mobilization of voters or a decrease in electoral 
participation as a result of voter disaffection with the democratic process. Kostadinova’s 
(2009) study of post-communist transitional countries seeks to identify both a direct 
(mobilization) and an indirect (disaffection) effect of corruption on turnout. However, 
she considers corruption perceptions, which given their possible correlation with voting 
decisions, casts some doubt on the model’s overall exogeneity. 
It has been shown that good governance is related to the citizens’ capacity to hold their 
politicians accountable (Adsera, et al., 2003). Thus, if we understand elections to be an 
effective tool for accountability, individuals who feel betrayed corrupt politicians may 
cast their vote to remove them from power. In this instance, corruption can be said to act 
as a mobilization factor – some citizens, who might otherwise have abstained, go to the 
polls in order to punish the politician embroiled in the scandal. Likewise, following 
reports of a scandal, party members and sympathisers may also be mobilized to give 
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 In most cases the empirical evidence confirms the negative relationship between corruption and turnout 
(Domínguez and McCann, 1998; Kostadinova, 2009; Birch, 2010; Chong et al., 2012). By contrast, a few 
studies (Karahan et al., 2006; Escaleras et al., 2012) attribute corruption with a positive effect on turnout. 
Finally, some studies find no relationship between corruption scandals and voter turnout (Stockemer, 
2013). 
5
 their support to the politician accused of being corrupt, either in the belief that the 
allegations are false or out of a need to offer their unconditional support. Alternatively, 
in highly corrupt contexts characterised by clientelistic networks, such scandals could 
stimulate turnout as corrupt politicians seek to buy voters so as to retain their power 
(Karahan et al., 2006).  
Conversely, corruption can also undermine voter turnout (Putnam, 1993; Warren, 2004; 
Chang and Chu, 2006). Corruption is detrimental to levels of citizen trust in local and 
national politicians (Solé-Ollé and Sorribas-Navarro, 2014), and this can result in 
cynicism and voter apathy. Disaffection means individuals are less likely to vote for 
what they see as corrupt political parties (Warren, 2004; Wagner et al., 2009). If 
episodes of corruption recur, disaffected individuals may in the long run decide to 
disengage from the electoral system (Chong et al., 2012) in the belief that given the 
widespread nature of corruption, replacing the corrupt incumbent with a new one will 
do nothing to remedy the situation. In the most extreme cases, widespread corruption 
might even result in doubts being cast on the sustainability of the whole democratic 
system (Kostadinova, 2009). Empirical evidence confirms this negative relationship 
between corruption and turnout (Domínguez and McCann, 1998; Andersen and 
Tverdova, 2003; Kostadinova, 2009; Stockemer, 2013; and Stockemer et al., 2013). 
2.2. Who is affected by corruption and why? 
The literature therefore fails to differentiate between the relative importance of the 
mobilization and disaffection effects resulting from corruption scandals. It is our 
contention that this is because two crucial factors tend to be excluded from such 
analyses: the role of individual partisan leanings and the timing of corruption.  
First, we consider that the mobilization and disaffection effects of corruption will differ 
depending on the strength of the voters’ partisan attachment with the incumbent 
implicated in the scandal. Adopting a similar strategy to the one we adopt here, Chong 
et al. (2012) take the analysis one step further, and show with experimental evidence 
that exposing Mexican citizens to information on corruption not only reduces voter 
turnout, but also negatively affects voters’ identification with the corrupt incumbent’s 
party. They find that providing information about high levels of corruption has a more 
marked impact on the challenger’s vote than it does on the incumbent’s; however, their 
data do not allow them to determine whether voters with different degrees of 
partisanship respond differently to corruption.  
Independent voters, i.e., those that only vote occasionally or who do not always vote for 
the same party, do not present such strong partisan attachments, and tend to be more 
deeply affected by shocks such as occasional episodes of corruption (Rundquist et al., 
1977; Feddersen and Pesendorfer, 1996; Sobbrio and Navarra, 2010; Stockemer, 2013). 
6
 As such, the disaffection effect is expected to be more marked for them and so we 
would expect to observe independent voters withdrawing from the elections if 
corruption scandals occur. Hence, the first hypothesis regarding partisan attachment is: 
H1.a: Independent voters (i.e., those who do not always vote for the same party) are 
more likely to abstain if a corruption scandal becomes public.  
By contrast, core supporters have stronger partisan leanings and are unlikely to defect 
(Chong et al., 2012). If partisan leanings are strong, citizens may disregard corruption 
as a determining factor in their decision and continue to vote for the party to which they 
are ideologically aligned (Peters and Welch, 1980; and Anderson and Tverdova, 2003). 
Ideology or party allegiance can also modify the way in which voters evaluate 
corruption, depending on the party to which the corrupt incumbent belongs. Anduiza et 
al. (2012) find, in support of this hypothesis, that individuals tend to present a partisan 
bias and are more tolerant of corruption if the politician involved is a member of their 
own party. If this were to be true, the core supporters of corrupt incumbents should be 
unaffected by corruption scandals when deciding to vote. Thus, the hypothesis we test 
is: 
H1.b: The incumbent’s core supporters do not modify their electoral participation 
decision as a result of a corruption scandal involving the incumbent.  
In the case of the core supporters of the opposition parties, our expectation is that, even 
though they are aware of corruption scandals, they continue to vote for their party. It 
may also be the case that, in the presence of corruption, some opposition core 
supporters who would otherwise have abstained go to the polls to oust the corrupt 
incumbent. However, those who identify closely with a political party are more likely to 
vote (Norris, 2004), so we are unlikely to observe this mobilization effect. Hence our 
final hypothesis regarding partisan attachment is: 
H1.c: Opposition core supporters do not modify their electoral participation decision as 
a result of a corruption scandal involving the incumbent. 
Second, we consider that the timing of a scandal may modify the influence of the 
mobilization or disaffection effects of corruption on voters’ participation decisions. 
There is evidence that voters tend to give greater weight to information received close to 
an upcoming election, as recent events have a stronger influence on their evaluations of 
the incumbent’s performance (Fair 1978; Kramer 1971). A further explanation for the 
stronger effects of recent scandals on turnout is that voters are more attentive to the 
indicators of the incumbent’s performance as an election approaches (Valentino and 
Sears 1998). Moreover, voters are not likely to recall so readily the details of the 
7
 incumbent’s earlier performance (i.e., past corruption cases) (Huber et al. 2012) and old 
episodes of corruption are more easily forgotten. 
Thus, while in the short term corruption can mobilize voters to oust corrupt 
governments, the relationship may not hold if corruption is persistent over time. This 
hypothesis is based on the fact that the persistence of corruption can affect citizens’ trust 
in the political system in different ways. Repeated cases of corruption over a period of 
years can result in citizens doubting the democratic system’s capacity to make 
politicians accountable (Kostadinova, 2009). Solé-Ollé and Sorribas-Navarro’s (2014) 
study shows that, for the Spanish case, corruption scandals have an impact on levels of 
citizen trust in local politicians. A lack of trust in the political system leads to 
disaffection and alienation from politics, which may result in voters withdrawing from 
the electoral process, i.e., increased rates of abstention. In such a scenario, repeated 
cases of corruption will set in motion a mechanism of disaffection via which corruption 
scandals reduce voter turnout. 
Hence, the following hypothesis regarding the effects of the timing of corruption cases 
on voter turnout can be formulated: 
H2: Past corruption cases do not affect turnout, while recent scandals either have no 
effect or mobilize people to vote. Repeated cases of corruption over time reduce voter 
turnout as a result of the disaffection effect.  
In conducting our study, we analyse these hypotheses, both independently and together. 
We predict that independent voters – those more susceptible to defection – will be more 
sensitive to repeated episodes of corruption, which will further erode their trust in the 
system. It is difficult to know how core supporters will react to the timing of corruption,  
as we predict that they are less likely to modify their electoral participation as a 
consequence of corruption.  
3.  Data and Empirical Analysis 
3.1. Data and typology of corruption scandals 
In order to carry out our analysis, we use a novel database that includes information on 
local corruption scandals in Spain, in addition to survey data from Spanish 
municipalities. We define a local corruption scandal as the “public allegation of 
corruption brought to light by a newspaper”. Our data on these corruption cases is based 
on a report compiled by the Fundación Alternativas (2007). Following a wave of local 
corruption scandals in the early 2000s, this Spanish think-tank hired several journalists 
to compile all the corruption-related stories published in the national, regional and local 
media between January 2000 and January 2007. However, the time period we are 
8
 interested in runs from the local elections in July 1999 to those held in May 2007. For 
this reason, we had to complete the Fundación Alternativas information with an 
internet-guided search
4
 for news on corruption scandals. Overall, we found that a total 
of 565 municipalities had been affected by corruption during this period
5
. We also 
verified that our data did not present a partisan bias by comparing our information with 
other corruption maps compiled by the media outlets of different political ideologies. 
The percentage of corruption cases by political party did not differ significantly across 
these databases, verifying that our compilation of cases was not ideologically biased. 
It should be stressed that during the early years of democracy (1979-1999), few local 
corruption cases were reported in the Spanish media (Jiménez and Caínzos, 2006). The 
cases we study here concern land use regulations, an area especially prone to corruption 
in Spain during the years of the housing boom. The cases involved local politicians 
taking bribes in return for introducing changes in the municipal land use plan (i.e., 
reclassifying public land). As Spain’s municipal governments are responsible for land 
use regulation, this makes it easier to detect the effect of these scandals on electoral 
outcomes. In such cases, voters can clearly identify the incumbent as being guilty of 
land-use related corruption. 
The number of corruption cases rose significantly in the late nineties, when the Spanish 
media started highlighting this form of corruption and the judiciary began their 
investigations. Indeed, the number of cases shot up after 1999 (Costas-Pérez et al., 
2012), peaking before the 2007 local elections. This distribution of corruption scandals 
makes the Spanish situation an optimal context in which to test our hypothesis that the 
exact timing of a corruption has a different effect on citizens’ voting behaviour.  
Our database includes 122 municipalities affected by corruption in the period from June 
1999 to May 2007. We classified them into three sub-categories (used throughout our 
analysis) according to the persistence of corruption. First, 32 municipalities experienced 
at least one corruption scandal in the term 1999-2003, but no subsequent cases were 
reported after that date. We refer to these as ‘past corruption cases’, since by the 2007 
elections voters can be expected to have only a distant memory of these scandals. 
Second, 58 municipalities experienced at least one corruption scandal in the term 2003-
2007, but no cases of corruption had been reported in the previous term. We refer to 
these as ‘recent corruption cases’ from the perspective of an individual deciding how 
(or whether) to vote at the 2007 local election. Third, we also considered those 
municipalities that have experienced repeated episodes of corruption, at least one case 
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 We used a paid digital information management service, MyNews, covering all national and many of 
the regional newspapers until November 2009. Thus, we have an additional sample of corruption cases 
occurring between the local elections of 2007 and November 2009 that we use to perform a placebo test 
(see section 4.6).  
5
 See Costas-Pérez et al. (2012) for more information on the construction of the corruption database. 
9
 in both the 1999-2003 and in the 2003-2007 terms of office. A total of 32 municipalities 
are classified in the category of ‘repeated corruption cases’.  
Hence, overall our corruption database indicates whether at least one corruption scandal 
was made public between June 1999 and May 2007 (the two terms of office analysed). 
Since our objective is to measure the impact of corruption, we need a sample of 
individuals from corruption-free municipalities that can be compared with those from 
municipalities affected by scandals. The fact of using a matched set of municipalities 
allows us to balance the distribution of covariates between corruption-ridden and 
corruption-free municipalities and so avoid biased estimations.  
3.2. The matching strategy 
In order to construct the sample for analysis we use a matched database that identifies a 
valid control group for each of the municipalities affected by corruption. Hence, a 
matching procedure was followed to select the corruption-free municipalities that could 
be compared with the corruption-ridden municipalities (our control and treatment 
groups, respectively). Implementation of the matching strategy allowed us to balance 
the covariates in the two subsamples. We ended up with a treatment group of 122 
municipalities that had experienced at least one corruption scandal between 1999 and 
2007. These, plus 97 control municipalities that did not experience any corruption in 
those years, constitute the 219 municipalities included in our database
6
.  
To confirm the quality of the match between the sample of treatment and control 
municipalities used in this paper we conducted various tests. We first analysed the 
percentage reduction in the standardised bias as the result of the matching procedure, 
finding a considerable decrease that showed a statistically significant bias before the 
matching. Second, we performed a comparison of means between the treatment and 
control units in the unmatched and matched samples (see Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1985). 
Table A.2. in the Appendix shows the means of each group for all variables considered 
when performing the matching. The last column of the table reports the test and p-
values of the differences in means between the treatment and the control groups. On 
matching the sample, these differences are no longer statistically significant. Third, we 
re-calculated the propensity score on the matched sample and compared the pseudo-R
2
 
before and after matching
7
. 
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 Solé-Ollé and Sorribas-Navarro (2013) originally selected a sample of 160 treatment municipalities and 
131 controls for scandals between 1999 and 2009. For the specific purposes of this paper we restricted the 
cases to those occurring before the 2007 local elections, and these are the matched sub-sample data that 
we use. All tests to verify that a good matching was achieved were conducted with both samples. 
7
 They were 0.237 and 0.002, respectively. LR tests of joint significance of the regressors before and after 
the matching have values of 1871.77 and 2.32, with p-values of 0.000 and 0.941. 
10
 We also performed a difference in means test for the individual level variables used in 
our analysis, using the survey observations as the treatment and control groups. The 
results of this test verify that interviewees from our treatment and control groups not 
only live in very similar municipalities, but also share the same individual traits. Table 
A.3. shows that the same conclusions regarding matching quality are drawn when we 
use our individual sample data. For this reason we consider that matching at the 
individual level is not necessary in our case since the citizens interviewed in the 
treatment and control municipalities are already very similar.   
After performing all these tests we can confirm that the sample of treatment and control 
municipalities selected for this paper were successfully balanced in their baseline 
characteristics across the groups, both for the municipalities and the individuals 
analysed. An additional advantage of the matching procedure is that it ensures complete 
transparency and guarantees the predetermined nature of our research design. Since the 
matching algorithm has to be applied before the estimation of the treatment, the 
decisions taken at this stage are not influenced by any information from the estimation 
results (Ho et al., 2007).  
3.3. Data on individual turnout and corruption perceptions 
This paper draws on the results of a survey specially designed for use in the selected 
matched municipalities
8
. The survey was conducted in November 2009 and specifically 
asked if the interviewee had voted in the 2007 local elections or not. Here, we use this 
information to obtain an indicator of individual electoral turnout
9
. 
As Table A.1 shows, the average turnout of our sample is slightly higher than the figure 
reported in the official statistics
10
. Previous papers have also suffered from this 
“overreporting” bias, explained by both the misreporting of non-voters among the 
survey’s respondents and the overrepresentation of actual voters (Traugott, 1989). 
However, several studies have shown that the overreporting problem has no real impact 
on the implications of the models’ estimations, which seek to shed light on the factors 
that may influence voting or abstention (Hillygus, 2003). Further, recent research shows 
that participation in surveys does not increase the probability of turning out to vote 
(Mann, 2005). Thus, we are confident of the implications of our results. 
A second question included in the survey concerned the respondents’ corruption 
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 The questionnaire used by Solé-Ollé and Sorribas-Navarro(2013) is available upon request. 
9
 The specific question asked in the survey was: ‘Did you vote at the last local elections held in May 
2007?’ Our main dependent variable considers those individuals that reported having voted at that 
election, excluding from the analysis those who were either too young to vote or who were not registered 
in that municipality at that time.   
10
 The actual voter turnout at the 2007 Spanish local elections for the municipalities analysed was 68.9%. 
More information on Spanish electoral outcomes can be found at: http://www.infoelectoral.mir.es/min/ 
11
 perceptions: ‘What level of corruption is there in local government, do you think?’ The 
interviewees were asked to indicate one of following five levels: 5 “very high”, 4 
“high”, 3 “medium”, 2 “low”, and 1 “none”11.  
Among other socioeconomic characteristics, the survey included questions about the 
respondents’ political preferences (e.g., partisan attachment and ideology), and 
information on a series of socio-economic controls (e.g., unemployed, type of job, 
marital status, etc.). 
3.4. Data on Individuals’ Partisan Leanings 
In order to test our hypothesis regarding the effects of partisan leanings on voter 
turnout, we classified interviewees according to the degree of partisan attachment 
shown and their self-reported ideology. To build our variables of partisan attachment we 
used the following survey question: ‘Do you usually vote for the same party at 
municipal elections?’ Interviewees who said they always vote for the same party were 
classified as ‘core supporters’; all others were classified as ‘independent voters’12. 
Note, independent voters include those that switch their vote from one election to 
another as well as those who do not always vote. As Table A.1 shows, ‘independent 
voters’ represent slightly more than half of our sample of individuals13.  
In the survey, interviewees were also asked to place themselves on the left-right 
spectrum using a seven-point scale, where 1 represents ‘extreme left’ and 7 represents 
‘extreme right’14. We also classified Spain’s political parties based on a combination of 
the party’s own ideological statements (where available), online rankings, as well as ad 
hoc rules for specifying party ideology. Our specification is necessarily arbitrary, but we 
consider it to account for the complex reality of the Spanish state
15
.  
To avoid any errors in our classifications we normalised both databases – interviewees’ 
self-reported ideology and party ideology – into a three-point scale, where 1 represents 
‘left’, 2 ‘centre’ and 3 ‘right’. We then combined the information in these two databases 
to determine whether each individual’s ideology matched that of the incumbent party. 
With this information we were then able to define the ‘incumbent core supporters’ as 
those core supporters who shared the ideology – left, centre or right – of the party 
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 Two additional categories (Don’t know and No answer) were used but they are not included in our 
analysis. 
12
 Individuals who answered Don’t know” or No answer were considered as ‘independent voters’. 
Interviewees who were too young to vote in the 2007 local elections were excluded from our analysis.    
13
 This value is in line with that reported in other countries. For example, the 2013 Gallup Poll result 
estimated that, on average, forty-two per cent of Americans identified themselves as political 
independents. 
14
 Interviewees who did not select any ideological position as an answer were classified as neither leaning 
to the left nor to the right, but as centre voters.  
15
 The classification (on the left-right spectrum) of the more than 200 Spanish political parties in office 
for the 2003-2007 term is available on request from the authors. 
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 forming the government in the term prior to the 2007 local elections (2003-2007). We 
classified the remaining core supporters as ‘opposition core supporters’.  
4.  Estimation Strategy 
In line with Ho et al’s (2007) proposal, we use the same parametric analysis on the 
matched sample as we would have used to analyse the original raw data. Derived for the 
dichotomous behaviour of our dependent variable – turnout – we use a Logit model. We 
need to bear in mind that when the matching is not exact the matching estimator will be 
biased in finite samples (Abadie and Imbens, 2002). Therefore, to reduce the biased 
term that remains after matching, we perform an additional bias correction, adjusting for 
covariates (Rubin, 1979; Dehejia and Wahba, 1999). Specifically, we run a Logit model 
with the matched sample and the covariates used in the estimation of the propensity 
score (Ho et al., 2007). 
 
Since matching with replacement was used to select the survey sample, we need to 
perform adjustments when implementing our analysis. We use weights in all 
estimations to ensure that the parametric analysis reflects the actual observations (Ho et 
al., 2007; Dehejia and Wahba, 1999). Thus, we weight the control municipalities by the 
number of times they are matched to a municipality affected by corruption. 
 
In order to measure the effect of corruption scandals on the voter turnout of an 
individual, we estimate the following general specification: 
Pr(Voteij=1) = α + β1Corruptionj + δX’ + εij                   (1) 
where Voteij is a dummy variable equal to one if the individual i voted in municipality j 
in the 2007 local elections; Corruptionj is a dummy variable equal to one if at least one 
corruption scandal was made public in municipality j between June 1999 and May 2007 
(two terms of office); X’ is a vector that includes the covariates used in the propensity 
score estimation and additional individual-level information from the survey
16
; and εij is 
the error term.  
The sign of β1 in Equation (1) indicates which effect – that is, mobilization (positive 
sign) or disaffection (negative sign) – predominates after a scandal is made public.  
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 We consider the following individual-level survey variables: income, education, gender, age, divorced, 
unemployed, student, retired, and immigrant.  
13
 In order to capture the effects of partisan leanings on the voter turnout of an individual, 
and to test our hypotheses that certain individuals are more (or less) likely to vote as a 
result of corruption, we estimate alternative specifications of our model. We include in 
Equation (1) interactions between corruption scandals and the variables indicating if the 
individual is an ‘independent voter’, an ‘incumbent core supporter’ or an ‘opposition 
core supporter’. 
Pr(Voteij=1) = α + β1Corruptionj + β2Incumbent Corei + β3Opposition Corei +  
β4Corruptionj x Incumbent Corei +  β5Corruptionj x Opposition Corei + δX’ + εij   (2) 
In Equation (2) we include interaction terms between the dummy variable that indicates 
if a corruption scandal has been made public in municipality j for the period analysed, 
and two dummy variables that indicate whether the individual is an incumbent or an 
opposition core supporter
17
. Hence, for independent voters the effect of corruption 
scandals on their participation decision is identified by the estimation of the coefficient 
β1 (where ‘independent voter’ is the base category of ‘incumbent core supporter’ and 
‘opposition core supporter’).   
In the interaction model of Equation (2) the coefficients estimated for ‘incumbent core 
supporter’ and ‘opposition core supporter’ (β2 and β3, respectively) are no longer 
interpretable as the unqualiﬁed turnout difference between the incumbent and the 
opposition’s core supporters with and without corruption scandals in their 
municipalities. Once these interactions are included in the model, these coefficients no 
longer represent a meaningful partial effect. 
The impact of corruption scandals on core supporters is represented by the linear 
combination of the estimated coefficients of ‘corruption’ (β1) and those of the 
‘incumbent core supporter’ or ‘opposition core supporter’ (β4 or β5, respectively). These 
effects do not appear directly in the model, and the significance of their linear 
combination must be tested after the estimation. 
All the corruption coefficients in Equations (1) and (2) estimate the overall effect of 
scandals on turnout, regardless of the timing of the corruption cases. To capture the 
different effects of corruption occurring at different points in time, we first estimate 
Equation (1) defining three different subsamples of corruption scandals: ‘past 
corruption cases’ (municipalities that experienced scandals in the 1999-2003 term, but 
none thereafter); ‘recent corruption cases’ (municipalities that experienced scandals in 
the 2003-2007 term, but none previously); and ‘repeated corruption cases’ 
(municipalities that experienced scandals in both the 1999-2003 and 2003-2007 terms).  
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 A detailed description of how the partisan leaning variables are built is included in section 3.4.  
14
 In order to estimate Equation (1) for each of these three corruption subsamples we  
adjusted the matching data to include just those municipalities affected by the specific 
corruption type under analysis and their pertinent controls.  
When the matching techniques were first applied to select the control municipalities in 
which to run the survey, the three subsamples – past, recent, and repeated corruption 
cases – were not considered separately. Taking the specific subsamples of the 
corruption-ridden municipalities under analysis and then applying a new matching 
procedure to each of them would have required a two-stage matching procedure. 
Unfortunately, this procedure was not adopted at that juncture. However, for all the 
estimations that consider the timing of the episode of corruption, the sample was 
adjusted to the specific group of treated municipalities, as well as their respective 
controls assigned during the full matching procedure. Thus, while we need to exercise 
some caution when interpreting the results from the matched data for these subsamples, 
we achieved a good balance between the corresponding treatment and control groups
18
.  
As for the effects of corruption scandals on voter turnout, we also consider the 
combined cases of different corruption timings and individual partisan leanings. This 
interaction model follows the Equation (2) specification for each of the three 
subsamples of corruption scandals: past, recent, and repeated corruption cases. The 
interpretation of the coefficient is the same as in Equation (2). 
Finally, to account for the possibility that our results are driven by the fact that citizens 
are unaware of the corruption scandals, we analyse the effect of these scandals on 
individuals’ corruption perceptions. Specifically, we estimate the following 
specification: 
Perceptionsij = α + β1Corruptionj + β2Incumbent Corei + β3Opposition Corei +  
β4Corruptionj x Incumbent Corei +  β5Corruptionj x Opposition Corei + δX’ + εij   (3) 
where Perceptionsij are the local corruption perceptions of the interviewees. The same 
covariates used in the previous estimations are included. The interpretation of the 
interaction effects is the same as in Equation (2) and Table 3. However, to account for 
the fact that our dependent variable is now categorical we estimate an Ordered Logit 
model. 
To deal with the multilevel structure of the dataset, with individuals belonging to 
different municipalities, in all the estimations we cluster standard errors at the 
municipality level. There are 219 municipalities in our general estimation. 
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Full results are available from the authors upon request. 
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 5.  Results 
Our empirical study is structured in five different phases. First, we analyse how 
individuals modify their participation at local elections if a scandal implicating the 
incumbent has been reported in either of the two previous terms of office. Next, we 
compare the individual turnout of citizens at these elections in terms of their degree of 
partisan attachment. Third, we evaluate how the timing of corruption affects the 
participation decision. Fourth, we combine the different timings of corruption scandals 
and an individual’s partisan leanings. Finally, we observe how scandals modify 
corruption perceptions so as to better understand the electoral behaviour of the 
individuals analysed.  
5.1. General Results 
The results of the Logit estimation of Equation (1) using our matched sample are 
presented in Table 1
19
.  
[Table 1 about here] 
We find that the revelation of a corruption scandal implicating the incumbent makes it 
less likely for an individual to vote at the local elections. This negative and statistically 
significant effect on voter turnout holds when we adjust both for the contextual-level 
variables and the individual characteristics (columns 2 to 4). As explained above, the 
adjustment for covariates in our model seeks to reduce the potential bias that remains 
after matching. However, the fact that our results are robust to the inclusion and 
exclusion of these covariates indicates that this bias is not a relevant issue in our 
estimation.  
Our negative estimation of the corruption coefficient indicates that, overall, the 
disaffection effect of corruption prevails over the mobilization factor. However, the 
interpretation of the logistic coefficients is not straightforward. To measure the 
substantive effects of the significant factors and to better understand the consequences 
of these findings we compute a simulation of the impact of a corruption scandal being 
made public. For this reason we use our estimates to perform a series of first difference 
calculations for an average voter
20
. We focus on the estimated changes in the probability 
of voting that result from the occurrence or otherwise of a corruption scandal in that 
municipality, holding all other variables constant. Thus, the predicted turnout 
probabilities were simulated using the significant coefficients from the Logit estimation 
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 Complete results for the covariates have been omitted for reasons of space but are available upon 
request. 
20
 These and all subsequent predicted coefficients were simulated using the CLARIFY program in Stata 
(Tomz et al. 2000), available at http://gking.harvard.edu/ 
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 of Equation (1). Predicted probabilities in Table 5 indicate that, on average, the 
revelation of a corruption scandal reduces an individual’s probability of voting by 2.1 
percentage points. This implies a 1.5% decrease in the likelihood that an individual 
from a corrupt municipality will vote as a consequence of the scandal being made 
public. Given that turnout at the 2007 local elections for the municipalities analysed is 
68.9%, with a standard deviation of 0.10, our results indicate that corruption scandals 
account for a significant – albeit not huge – fall in aggregate turnout levels. 
The estimations in Table 1 show how all citizens considered as an aggregate group react 
to corruption scandals. However, as discussed, depending on their partisan leanings, 
some individuals might be mobilized to vote, while others might decide to withdraw 
from the elections as a consequence of the scandals. 
5.2. Partisan Leanings  
Table 2 shows the Logit estimation of Equation (2), as well as the linear combinations 
of the different coefficients. 
[Table 2 about here] 
The estimations in Table 2 are controlled by the fact that the individual can be either an 
independent voter or a core supporter of the incumbent or opposition, while they also 
include interaction terms between corruption and an individual’s partisan leanings. 
Following the same strategy as in Table 1, column (1) estimates the model without 
adjusting for covariates, column (2) includes contextual-level variables, column (3) 
includes individual-level variables, and column (4) accounts for both groups of controls. 
The corruption coefficient is not statistically significant when the covariates are not 
included in the specification. Once they are included in the model, all estimations 
indicate a negative and statistically significant effect of corruption. Adjusting for 
covariates reduces the bias that remains after matching, and the estimation of the 
coefficient is stable in all specifications. 
Table 2 also reports the linear combinations for the statistically significant interactions 
between corruption and an individual’s degree of partisanship. With this information we 
can verify the hypotheses formulated in Section 2.1 regarding partisan leanings. Our 
first hypothesis (H1.a) states that independent voters are more likely to abstain if a 
corruption scandal is made public. Our results show that this holds once we adjust for 
covariates. Table 5 indicates that the difference in the predicted probability of voting in 
the case of the independent voter, as the corruption variable (‘all corruption cases’ 
category) changes from zero to one, is 3.6 percentage points, revealing a 4.4% reduction 
in the independent voter’s likelihood of voting.   
17
 To consider the reaction of the core supporters we need to observe (see Table 2) the 
linear combinations of coefficients associated with ‘corruption’ and its interaction with 
‘incumbent’ or ‘opposition core supporter’ in Equation (2). Hypothesis H1.b considers 
those regular voters that share the same ideology as the party holding office in local 
government. We predict that partisan leanings make individuals more tolerant of their 
own party’s corruption and so they do not change their participation decision in 
response to a scandal. Our results confirm this, suggesting that voters tend to accept 
evidence of the incumbent’s corruption if they belong to the same party (Anduiza et al., 
2012).   
Finally, in order to verify H1.c, which hypothesizes about the response of the core 
supporters of the opposition parties, we analysed the linear combinations of coefficients 
associated with ‘corruption’ and its interaction with ‘opposition core supporter’ in 
Equation (2). Our test results verify that opposition core supporters do not change their 
electoral participation. 
It should be borne in mind that the estimations in Tables 1 and 2 measure the overall 
impact of any scandal that broke out between June 1999 and May 2007. For this reason 
in the following sub-section the persistence of corruption scandals is taken into account. 
5.3. Timing of Corruption 
To test our hypothesis that cases of corruption occurring at different points in time may 
affect an individual’s participation decision, we considered the following three 
subsamples: ‘past corruption cases’, ‘recent corruption cases’ and ‘repeated corruption 
cases’. The Logit results of these estimations are presented in Table 3.  
[Table 3 about here] 
In these estimations the matching sample has been adjusted to include the municipalities 
affected by the specific corruption cases analysed, as well as their pertinent controlled 
pairs.  
Panels A and B in Table 3 show the results of the estimation of Equation (1) 
considering ‘past corruption cases’ and ‘recent corruption cases’, respectively. None of 
the estimations are statistically significant, indicating that neither corruption cases that 
occurred some years previously nor cases coming to light in the period immediately 
preceding the elections modify the individual’s electoral participation decision. Citizens 
appear not to remember past scandals, and our results fail to support the idea that 
individuals attach greater importance to more recent cases of corruption (Fair 1978; 
Kramer 1971). This might be because citizens perceive information received in the 
period leading up to the elections as electoral noise and are unable to distinguish 
between real episodes of corruption and the electoral strategies of the opposition.   
18
 By contrast, Panel C shows that repeated episodes of corruption do have an impact on 
voter turnout, with individuals resident in these municipalities more likely to abstain in 
the local elections. After experiencing corruption scandals in consecutive terms of 
office, citizens may begin to call into question the efficiency of elections as a tool for 
ensuring the accountability of their representatives. This will lead to an increase in 
disaffection, resulting in some individuals withdrawing from the electoral process. 
Thus, persistent evidence of corruption means the disaffection effect becomes more 
predominant than the mobilization factor, reducing voter turnout. 
Table 5 shows a fall of 4.5 percentage points in the predicted individual turnout for 
individuals from municipalities that have experienced at least one corruption scandal in 
both terms of office analysed (1999-2003 and 2003-2007). This reduction represents a 
4.8% fall in the probability of their voting, a much higher value than the 1.4% decrease 
obtained when we considered all corruption cases. 
These results confirm our hypothesis regarding the timing of corruption (H2): 
occasional episodes of corruption (either past or recent) have no effect on voter turnout, 
while repeated scandals make an individual less likely to vote. Following this analysis 
of individual reactions to corruption (depending on partisan leanings) and how scandals 
occurring at different times modify voter turnout, we proceed to estimate the combined 
effect of both factors. 
5.4. Timing of Corruption and Partisan Leanings 
Table 4 shows the Logit estimation of Equation (2) considering all corruption cases and 
the three subcategories of scandals: ‘past corruption cases’, ‘recent corruption cases’ 
and ‘repeated corruption cases’. It also reports the results of the linear combination 
tests for the different coefficients
21
. 
[Table 4 about here] 
Column (1) in Table 4 measures the impact of all corruption cases (‘corruption’) 
occurring between 1999 and 2007 on voter turnout, controlling for the fact that the 
individual might be an independent voter or an incumbent or opposition core supporter. 
Column (2) considers the same equation and category of corruption cases, also 
including the interactions terms between corruption types and an individual’s partisan 
leanings. Columns (3) and (4) follow the same specification for the subsample ‘past 
corruption cases’, (5) and (6) for ‘recent corruption cases’ and finally, (7) and (8) for 
’repeated corruption cases’. Even with the introduction of partisan leanings, scandals 
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 Tables 4 and 5 show the estimation adjusted for both the contextual-level variables and the individual 
characteristics. Alternative estimations not adjusting for those covariates lead to the same results, but they 
have been omitted for reasons of space. Complete results are available upon request. 
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 are significant for all corruption cases and repeated corruption (columns (1) and (7), 
respectively).  
Our results show that hypothesis H1.a - that independent voters are more likely to 
abstain if a scandal is made public - holds when repeated corruption cases are taken into 
account (column (8)). As Table 2 shows, HI.a is also true when we analyse all 
corruption cases (column (2)). Past and recent corruption cases do not affect the 
participation decision of independent voters. When considering independent voters 
only, Table 5 shows that the overall effect of corruption reduces the estimated 
probability of voting by 3.6 percentage points. As a result, independent voters are 4.4% 
less likely to vote if at least one corruption scandal has been revealed in their 
municipalities between 1999 and 2007. Repeated cases of corruption account for a 6.3% 
reduction in their predicted probability of voting, implying a decrease of 5.3 points as 
the ‘repeated corruption cases’ variable changes from zero to one (Table 5). Hence, we 
can affirm that in this instance corruption cases do have an effect on independent voters, 
who will tend to withdraw from the elections as a consequence of increasing 
disaffection. 
Hypothesis H1.b claims that higher degrees of partisanship make individuals more 
tolerant of corruption within their own party. Hence, we expect incumbent core 
supporters not to modify their participation in the elections as a consequence of 
corruption. As seen in Table 2, the hypothesis is found to hold even when the different 
sub-categories of corruption are considered.  
If we analyse the behaviour of the opposition core supporters we can see, from the 
linear combinations shown in Table 4, that they do not modify their electoral 
participation. This holds for all the corruption categories analysed. Our results verify 
that the turnout of opposition core supporters does not increase if a scandal is revealed 
but remains unchanged. 
The results in Table 4 show that neither the incumbent’s core supporters nor those of the 
opposition modify their voting behaviour as a consequence of corruption scandals. We 
are therefore unable to identify any effect of corruption on the core supporters’ level of 
electoral participation. This could indicate that the mobilization and the disaffection 
effects cancel each other out for individuals with a strong attachment to a political party. 
To verify this, and also to determine whether core supporters fail to see their party 
malfeasance as corruption (or if they do yet nevertheless opt to vote for them), we 
estimate the effect of corruption scandals on individuals’ corruption perceptions. 
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 5.5. Corruption Perceptions  
Table 6 shows the Ordered Logit estimation of Equation (3), as well as the linear 
combinations of the interaction coefficients
22
. 
[Table 6 about here] 
Our results show that, except for past corruption cases, scandals always increase 
independent voters’ perceptions of corruption, even controlling for individuals’ partisan 
leanings. However, after including the interaction effects between scandals and ideology 
in our model, our results are no longer homogeneous across all groups of individuals.  
The corruption perceptions of the incumbent’s core supporters do not increase for any 
of the corruption types. Indeed, these citizens do not seem to be aware that their party is 
involved in a scandal, either because they fail to attach any value to the importance of 
the scandals attributed to the incumbent or they simply fail to believe the accusations of 
corruption. Or, it might be that the incumbent’s core supporters are more tolerant when 
judging scandals affecting their own party, even while recognising the potential 
existence of corruption (Anduiza et al., 2012). 
Considering all corruption cases (‘corruption’), the corruption perceptions of both 
independent voters and the opposition’s core supporters rise after a scandal is made 
public. We have already shown that the opposition’s core supporters do not modify their 
participation decision as a consequence of these scandals, but they do report higher 
levels of corruption perception. This supports our suspicion that if corruption is present, 
core supporters of opposition parties maintain their support for their party in an attempt 
at ousting the corrupt incumbent. We have no evidence of a mobilization effect for these 
individuals, which is not unexpected given that core supporters by definition tend to 
vote. However, we can conclude that the disaffection effect is not relevant in the case of 
opposition core supporters.   
For ‘past corruption cases’, the corruption perceptions of all groups of individuals 
remain unchanged. This can be attributed to the fact that voters seem to have short 
memories in relation to old scandals. While independent voters are less likely to vote in 
municipalities marked by past corruption cases, they do not report higher levels of 
corruption perceptions. It would seem that voters in municipalities that reported 
corruption scandals in the past had already modified their perceptions by the time our 
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 The number of observations for the results in Table 6 is not as high as for the other results as several 
interviewees did not answer the question about corruption perceptions. Since the effect of scandals on 
individuals’ perceptions is not the principle objective of our paper we decided not to include all these 
observations in our main results. We also performed the thresholds tests of all the specifications of our 
Ordered Logit, concluding that it is not possible to reduce the number of cut-offs delimiting a category. 
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 survey was conducted; hence, they did not subsequently report an increased awareness 
of corruption.   
For ‘recent corruption cases’, the corruption perceptions of both independent voters and 
the opposition’s core supporters increase after a scandal is made public. However, we 
did not find any effect on the turnout in either group. Hence, in the short term, local 
scandals do affect the corruption perceptions of independent voters and the opposition’s 
core supporters, but this does not immediately affect individuals’ electoral participation 
decisions. 
Finally, ‘repeated corruption cases’ also increase the corruption perceptions of both 
independent voters and the opposition’s core supporters. However, only the turnout of 
independent voters is affected by the persistence of corruption. 
As in the previous estimations, considering that we have a non-linear model with 
multiple interaction terms, the simulation-based approach is the most practical 
alternative for estimating the actual impact of corruption scandals on individuals’ 
perceptions (Tomz et al., 2000). Table 7 reports the simulations of the predicted  
changes in probability of voting in the corruption perceptions using the significant 
coefficients obtained from the Ordered Logit estimation of Equation (3).  
[Table 7 about here] 
The model simulations included all the contextual and individual covariates, as well as 
the whole set of interactions (columns (2), (4), (6) and (8) in Table 6). We see that when 
a corruption scandal breaks out independent voters are 3.2 percentage points more likely 
to perceive their municipality as having “very high” levels of corruption. This value 
rises to 4 points for recent corruption cases. However, as we saw in Table 4 this does 
not imply that independent voters withdraw from the elections if a recent corruption 
case has been revealed in their municipality. A similar effect is seen for the opposition’s 
core supporters, which are 3 percentage points more likely to perceive “very high” 
levels of corruption if a scandal breaks out, while for repeated cases of corruption, they 
are 3.9 points less likely to consider there to be no corruption (“none”) in their 
municipality. This value for independent voters is 3.5 points. However, as we see in 
Table 6, modifications in perceptions following the reporting of a scandal depend to a 
large extent on the individual’s baseline corruption perceptions. That is, if independent 
voters already have a very low opinion of their local politicians’ integrity, they are less 
likely to report an increase in their corruption perceptions once a scandal is made 
public. In any case, the information included in Tables 4-7 indicates that corruption 
perceptions are not immediately translated into electoral actions for all individual types.    
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 5.6. Placebo tests 
The ‘conditional independence’ or ‘unconfoundedness’ assumption is based on the 
presumption that the treatment satisfies some type of exogeneity (Rosenbaum and 
Rubin, 1983; Imbens and Wooldridge, 2008). As explained above, this requires turnout 
to be independent of corruption scandals. If this were the case, systematic differences in 
individual turnout between the treated and control municipalities, with the same 
individual and contextual traits, can be attributed to the treatment – corruption scandals. 
We check for the exogeneity of our treatment by testing that our results are not driven 
by either spurious correlations or an omitted trend that affects both the corruption cases 
and electoral turnout. Hence, we conduct two placebo tests to verify that levels of voter 
turnout are not explained by future corruption 
Our first placebo test considers our general sample of observations at the municipal 
level, and verifies that corruption occurring after 1999 does not explain levels of turnout 
in that year: 
Turnout99= -0.005 Corruption>99 + 0.932Turnout87-95      (4) 
              (0.007)     (0.038)
***
 
where Turnout99 is the local electoral turnout in 1999 for the municipalities in our 
sample, Corruption>99 is a dummy variable equal to one if at least one corruption 
scandal broke out after 1999, and Turnout87-95 is the average level of electoral turnout 
between 1987 and 1995. Standard errors are in brackets and 
***
 indicates a 1% level of 
signiﬁcance. Thus, we find that corruption scandals had no significant effect on 
previous levels of turnout, confirming the assumption that there is no omitted variable 
bias. 
Since the original sample was made up of 160 treatment municipalities, including those 
that experienced corruption after the local elections of 2007, there are 38 additional 
treatment municipalities that are not used in our analysis. These municipalities reported 
at least one corruption scandal between May 2007 and November 2009, when the 
survey was carried out, but not at any time before. Thus, we can also perform a placebo 
test with the corruption cases that were reported after the 2007 local elections. This 
placebo test follows the specification:  
Turnout07= 0.008 Corruption07-09 + 0.828Turnout87-95       (5) 
              (0.012)     (0.044)
***
 
where Turnout07 is the local electoral turnout in 2007 for the municipalities in our 
sample, Corruption07-09 is a dummy variable equal to one if at least one corruption 
scandal broke out after 2007, and Turnout87-95 is the average level of electoral turnout 
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 between 1987 and 1995, which was used to conduct our matching. Standard errors are 
in brackets and 
***
 indicates a 1% level of signiﬁcance. Hence, our second placebo test 
confirms the previous results, verifying that the ‘conditional independence assumption’ 
holds.   
6. Conclusions 
This paper has examined the effects of local corruption scandals on voter turnout and 
finds that corruption generates disaffection with the electoral system among the 
politically alienated. Consequently, some individuals abstain, withdrawing from the 
electoral process, thus helping corrupt incumbents retain office.  
Drawing on data identifying cases of corruption at the local level in Spain between 1999 
and 2007, and survey information on turnout at the individual level, we devise a 
balanced matched sample of corruption-ridden and corruption-free municipalities. 
Overall, our results support the hypothesis that the disaffection attributable to scandals 
predominates over the impact of such episodes on voter mobilization. On average, an 
episode of corruption in a municipality makes individuals 1.5% less likely to vote. This 
result, however, is lower than that reported by Chong et al. (2012), who found that 
exposing Mexican citizens to information on corruption reduces voter turnout by 3%.  
The paper’s main contribution is that we have been able to identify both individual 
partisan leanings and the timing of the scandals as being key determinants of the way in 
which potential voters react to corruption. We show, first, that scandals only affect the 
turnout of those citizens that do not manifest any strong political attachments. These 
independent voters are 4.4% less likely to vote if a corruption scandal becomes public. 
By contrast, those with strong partisan leanings (core supporters) do not react to cases 
of corruption, irrespective of whether they support the incumbent party or the 
opposition. Second, we show that, while neither past nor recent corruption scandals 
have an impact on the voting participation decisions of individuals, repeated instances 
of corruption result in higher rates of abstention. Thus, for those municipalities that 
experienced at least one case of corruption in both terms of office analysed (1999-2003 
and 2003-2007), individuals were 4.8% less likely to vote, a much higher probability 
than that found when all corruption scandals are considered together. Hence, persistent 
corruption causes feelings of disaffection to predominate over the mobilization factor, 
thus reducing voter turnout.  
When considering the combined effect of these two determinants, we find that 
independent voters are even less likely to vote when faced by repeated cases of 
corruption. In this instance, the likelihood of voting falls by 6.3%. Past and recent 
corruption cases do not seem to have an impact on any group of individuals as neither 
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 the incumbent’s nor the opposition’s core supporters change their electoral participation 
decision if a scandal is revealed, irrespective of the timing of corruption analysed. Thus, 
our results show that, with the exception of recent scandals, cases of corruption only 
have an effect on independent voters, who may abstain as a result of their feelings of 
disaffection. 
Our analysis of the corruption perceptions of individuals suggests that the incumbent’s 
core supporters are unaware of such episodes. Their failure to report higher levels of 
corruption perception when a scandal is made public supports Anduiza et al’s  (2012) 
findings that citizens are more tolerant of an incumbent’s malfeasance if they share the 
same ideology. The corruption perceptions of both the core supporters of opposition 
parties and independent voters are raised when a scandal is revealed; however, the 
former do not modify their electoral participation. We surmise that they continue to vote 
for the candidate of the party with which they share a close ideological affinity with the 
aim of defeating the party embroiled in the scandal. 
Voter turnout is one of the key indicators of a political system’s democratic health. We 
have found that local corruption scandals affect voter turnout by dissuading citizens 
from voting. These results allow us to reinterpret earlier conclusions reported in the 
literature that attribute the absence of any notable electoral punishment of corruption to 
cultural explanations. Considering the non-trivial effect reported here of scandals on 
voter turnout, we are able to confirm that some individuals react to corruption by 
withdrawing from elections. It is difficult to speculate as to what would happen if 
independent voters did not withdraw from the elections as a consequence of corruption. 
However, since a fall in turnout tends to have a more marked effect on minority 
parties
23
, it seems highly likely that the votes cast by disaffected citizens would make it 
much more difficult for corrupt politicians to retain power. Considering both the 
incumbent’s vote loss and the fall in voter turnout, the actual impact of corruption on 
electoral outcomes may be much higher than is currently reported in the literature. 
                                                          
23
 Hansford and Gomez, (2010). 
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Table 1: Effects of corruption scandals on voter turnout: all corruption cases. 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Corruption -0.146 -0.165 -0.164 -0.164 
  (0.088)
*
 (0.071)
**
 (0.087)
*
 (0.074)
**
 
Contextual-level variables NO YES NO YES 
Individual-level variables NO NO YES YES 
Observations 8,014 8,014 8,014 8,014 
Notes: (1) Dependent variable: whether the individual has voted (=1) or not (=0). (2) Standard 
errors clustered at the municipal level in parentheses; 
***
: p<0.01. 
**
: p<0.05. 
*
: p<0.1. (3) 
Estimation method: Maximum Likelihood; (4) Treated observations weighted as 1, and control 
observations weighted by the number of times they are matched to a treatment observation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Effects of corruption scandals and individual's partisan leanings on 
voter turnout. Logit results. 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Corruption 
-0.189 -0.213 -0.237 -0.244 
(0.145) (0.123)
*
 (0.140)
*
 (0.133)
*
 
Corruption x Inc. core sup. 
-0.035 0.002 0.043 0.088 
(0.230) (0.218) (0.236) (0.226) 
Corruption x Opp. core sup. 
0.140 0.154 0.218 0.223 
(0.265) (0.270) (0.272) (0.279) 
Incumbent core sup.  -0.257  -0.224  -0.221  -0.194 
                      Test: β1+β4 ≠ 0 [0.249] [0.294] [0.392] [0.390] 
Opposition core sup.  -0.034  -0.049  -0.059  -0.019 
                    Test: β1+β5 ≠ 0 [0.826] [0.778] [0.756] [0.917] 
Contextual-level variables NO YES NO YES 
Individual-level variables NO NO YES YES 
Observations 8,014 8,014 8,014 8,014 
Notes: (1) Dependent variable: whether the individual has voted (=1) or not (=0). (2) 
Standard errors clustered at the municipal level in parentheses; 
***
: p<0.01. 
**
: p<0.05. 
*
: 
p<0.1. (3) Estimation method: Maximum Likelihood; (4) Treated observations weighted 
as 1, and control observations weighted by the number of times they are matched to a 
treatment observation; (5) Linear combinations of coefficients β1+β4/5≠0, measuring the 
interaction's total effect. p-values in brackets. 
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 Table 3: Effects of corruption scandals on voter turnout: timing of corruption. Logit 
results. 
Panel A (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Past  corruption cases -0.143 -0.139 -0.151 -0.124 
  (0.162) (0.135) (0.151) (0.130) 
Contextual-level variables NO YES NO YES 
Individual-level variables NO NO YES YES 
Observations 1,796 1,796 1,796 1,796 
Panel B (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Recent  corruption cases 0.046 -0.000 0.065 0.033 
  (0.112) (0.112) (0.112) (0.112) 
Contextual-level variables NO YES NO YES 
Individual-level variables NO NO YES YES 
Observations 3,129 3,129 3,129 3,129 
Panel C (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Repeated corruption cases -0.329 -0.276 -0.384 -0.324 
  (0.125)
 ***
 (0.116)
 **
 (0.140)
 ***
 (0.118)
 ***
 
Contextual-level variables NO YES NO YES 
Individual-level variables NO NO YES YES 
Observations 3,089 3,089 3,089 3,089 
Notes: (1) Dependent variable: whether the individual has voted (=1) or not (=0). (2) Standard errors 
clustered at the municipal level in parentheses; 
***
: p<0.01. 
**
: p<0.05. 
*
: p<0.1. (3) Estimation 
method: Maximum Likelihood; (4) Treated observations weighted as 1, and control observations 
weighted by the number of times they are matched to a treatment observation. 
 
 
 
Table 4: Effects of timing of corruption scandals and individual's partisan leanings on voter turnout. 
Logit results. 
Variables 
All corruption cases 
Past corruption 
cases 
Recent corruption 
cases 
Repeated corruption 
cases 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Corruption 
-0.180 -0.244 -0.166 -0.268 0.004 -0.036 -0.309 -0.368 
(0.078)
**
 (0.133)
*
 (0.137) (0.174) (0.119) (0.155) (0.127)
**
 (0.190)
*
 
Corruption x Inc. 
core sup. 
 --.-- 0.088  --.-- 0.007  --.-- 0.203  --.-- -0.053 
  (0.226)   (0.382)   (0.306)   (0.389) 
Corruption x Opp. 
core sup. 
 --.-- 0.223  --.-- 0.529  --.-- 0.043  --.-- 0.259 
  (0.279)   (0.305)
*
   (0.287)   (0.382) 
Incumbent core 
sup. 
 --.--  -0.156  --.--  -0.261  --.-- 0.167  --.--  -0.421 
 Test: β1+β4 ≠ 0   [0.440]   [0.439]   [0.552]   [0.194] 
Opposition core 
sup. 
 --.--  -0.021  --.-- 0.261  --.-- 0.007  --.--  -0.109 
 Test: β1+β5 ≠ 0   [0.912]   [0.338]   [0.976]   [0.708] 
Contextual-level 
variables 
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Individual-level 
variables 
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 8,014 8,014 1,796 1,796 3,129 3,129 3,089 3,089 
Notes: (1) Dependent variable: whether the individual has voted (=1) or not (=0). (2) Standard errors clustered at the 
municipal level in parentheses; ***: p<0.01. **: p<0.05. *: p<0.1. (3) Estimation method: Maximum Likelihood; (4) 
Treated observations weighted as 1, and control observations weighted by the number of times they are matched to a 
treatment observation; (5) Linear combinations of coefficients β1+β4/5≠0, measuring the interaction's total effect. p-
values in brackets. 
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Table 5: Effects of corruption scandals on voter turnout. Difference in the predicted probability of voting. 
 
Variables 
All corruption 
cases 
Repeated corruption 
cases 
All citizens  -0.021  -0.042 
Independent Voters  -0.036  -0.054 
Contextual-level variables YES YES 
Individual -level variables YES YES 
Notes: (1) Estimates generated by running post-estimation simulations of the 
significant coefficients from Tables 1-4 using the Clarify routine in Stata as 
described by Tomz et al. (2000), setting each explanatory variable at its mean 
value. They indicate the difference in the predicted probability of voting as the 
corruption variable changes from zero to one; (2) Dependent variable: whether the 
individual has voted (=1) or not (=0); (3) Treated observations weighted as 1, and 
control observations weighted by the number of times they are matched to a 
treatment observation. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6: Effects of corruption scandals on individual's corruption perceptions. Ordered Logit results. 
  
All corruption cases 
Past corruption 
cases 
Recent corruption 
cases 
Repeated corruption 
cases 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Corruption 
0.327 0.358 0.194 0.261 0.356 0.417 0.391 0.360 
(0.108)
***
 (0.117)
***
 (0.163) (0.197) (0.131)
***
 (0.161)
***
 (0.1710)
**
 (0.193)
*
 
Corruption x Inc. core 
sup. 
 --.--  -0.325  --.-- -0.262  --.-- -0.397  --.-- -0.183 
  (0.146)
**
   (0.277)   (0.216)
*
   (0.227) 
Corruption x Opp. 
core sup. 
 --.-- 0.146  --.-- -0.045  --.-- 0.105  --.-- 0.237 
  (0.130)   (0.231)   (0.176)   (0.182) 
Incumbent core sup.  --.-- 0.032  --.--  -0.001  --.-- 0.020  --.-- 0.177 
 Test: β1+β4 ≠ 0   [0.796]   [0.997]   [0.914]   [0.384] 
Opposition core sup.  --.-- 0.505  --.-- 0.216  --.-- 0.521  --.-- 0.597 
 Test: β1+β5 ≠ 0   [0.002]   [0.339]   [0.004]   [0.014] 
Contextual-level 
variables 
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Individual -level 
variables 
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 6,259 6,259 1,387 1,387 2,394 2,394 2,478 2,478 
Notes: (1) Dependent variable: Perceptions of local political corruption: 5=Very High Corruption. 4=High. 3=Medium. 
2=Low. 1=None. (2) Standard errors clustered at the municipal level in parentheses; ***: p<0.01. **: p<0.05. *: p<0.1. (3) 
Estimation method: Maximum Likelihood; (4) Treated observations weighted as 1, and control observations weighted by the 
number of times they are matched to a treatment observation; (5) Linear combinations of coefficients β1+β4/5≠0, measuring 
the interaction's total effect. p-values in brackets. 
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 Table 7: Effects of corruption scandals on individual's corruption perceptions. 
Simulations. 
Variables 
Perceptions of local political corruption category 
None Low Medium High Very High 
All Corruption Cases           
Independent Voters -0,053 -0,035 0,007 0,049 0,032 
Opposition core supporter -0,056 -0,031 0,009 0,049 0,030 
Recent  corruption cases           
Independent Voters -0,070 -0,044 0,008 0,066 0,040 
Opposition core supporter -0,075 -0,038 0,010 0,066 0,037 
Repeated corruption cases           
Independent Voters -0,035 -0,047 0,003 0,048 0,031 
Opposition core supporter -0,039 -0,042 0,006 0,049 0,027 
Notes: (1) Estimates generated by running post-estimation simulations of the significant 
coefficients from Table 6 using the Clarify routine in Stata as described by Tomz et al. 
(2000), setting each explanatory variable at its mean value. They indicate the difference in 
the predicted probability of voting as the corruption variable changes from zero to one; (2) 
Dependent variable: Perceptions of local political corruption: 5=Very High Corruption. 
4=High. 3=Medium. 2=Low. 1=None; (3) Treated observations weighted as 1, and control 
observations weighted by the number of times they are matched to a treatment 
observation; (4) All estimations include contextual and individual level variables. 
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 Appendix. 
 
Table A.1: Definition of the variables and Summary Statistics 
Variable Definition Mean St.Dev. Min Max 
Individual-level variables 
Turnout  
Dummy variable coded 1 if the individual voted in the 
2007 local elections 
0,775 0,418 0 1 
Income 
Self-reported socio-economic classification (1-5): 1: Low; 
2: Medium-low; 3: Medium; 4: Medium-High; 5: High  
3,357 1,308 1 5 
Schooling 
Highest level of education completed (1-5): 1: any studies; 
2: primary; 3: secondary; 4: graduate 
46,323 16,697 1 5 
Age Age in years 0,499 0,500 18 99 
Female Dummy variable coded 1 for females     0 1 
Divorced 
Dummy variable coded 1 for people who are divorced or 
separated 
0,046 0,209 0 1 
Unemployed Dummy variable coded 1 for people who are unemployed 0,142 0,349 0 1 
Student Dummy variable coded 1 for students (do not work) 0,058 0,233 0 1 
Retired Dummy variable coded 1 for people who are retired 0,208 0,406 0 1 
Immigrant 
Dummy variable coded 1 for people who are not born in 
Spain 
0,035 0,183 0 1 
Corruption 
Perceptions 
Self-reported perceptions of local political corruption (1-
5): 1: None; 2: Low; 3: Medium; 4: High; 5: Very High 
Corruption 
2,719 1,313 1 5 
Ideology Self-reported ideology (1-3): 1: Left; 2: Centre; 3: Right 1,831 0,711 1 3 
Independent 
Dummy variable coded 1 for people who do not always 
vote for the same party 
0,512 0,500 0 1 
Incumbent core 
Supporter 
Dummy variable coded 1 for people who always vote for 
the same party, and their ideology is the same as the 
incumbent's 
0,215 0,411 0 1 
Opposition 
core Supporter 
Dummy variable coded 1 for people who always vote for 
the same party, and their ideology is the same as the 
opposition' party 
0,272 0,445 0 1 
Contextual-level variables 
Corruption 
Dummy variable coded 1 for municipalities with at least 
one corruption scandal in the period 1999-2007 
0,482 0,500 0 1 
Past  
corruption 
cases 
Dummy variable coded 1 for municipalities with at least 
one corruption scandal in the period 1999-2003, but were 
not corruption has broke out afterwards 
0,110 0,313 0 1 
Recent  
corruption 
cases 
Dummy variable coded 1 for municipalities with at least 
one corruption scandal in the period 2003-2007, but were 
not corruption has broke out before 
0,188 0,390 0 1 
Repeated  
corruption 
cases 
Dummy variable coded 1 for municipalities with at 
corruption scandal in both periods: 1999-2003 and 2007-
2009. 
0,185 0,388 0 1 
Voter turnout 
Average voter turnout at the 1987, 1991 and 1995 local 
elections 
0,687 0,084 0,508 0,922 
Income p.c. 
Average socio-economic condition. Arithmetic average of 
the socio-economic condition according to their 
employment status 
0,951 0,118 0,610 1,200 
Divorced  
Percentage of divorced and separated among all 
population 
0,029 0,012 0,002 0,074 
Graduate  
Percentage of population with third level studies (diploma, 
degree and doctorate) among population 16 years and 
older 
0,128 0,069 0,016 0,434 
Unemployment Percentage of unemployed among individuals aged 20-59 0,157 0,079 0,048 0,675 
Ethnic diversity  
1- Σk(Popk/Population)2 where Pop_contk is population 
whose nationality is from continent k, and k refers to 
Europe, Africa, America and others 
0,058 0,058 0 0,279 
Right voters  
Average historical vote share that the right wing parties 
obtained in 1979, 1982, 1986 and 1989 local elections 
0,226 0,093 0,037 0,483 
log(Population)  Log of the registered population 10,545 1,778 6,973 14,957 
Notes: (1) Source of the individual-level variables: own-designed survey (see Box A.1). (2) the contextual-level variables: (i) 
2001 Census of Population (National Institute of www.ine.es), for Income p.c., % Divorced, % Graduate, % Unemployed, 
population by continent used to construct the Ethnic diversity index, and Population. (ii) Database on corruption scandals, 
constructed form an initial list of scandals compiled by Fundación Alternativas and own Internet searches (see section 3 for more 
details). (iii) Voting data from the Ministry of the Interior, used for the construction of the % Right voters and % Vote turnout 
variables. 
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Table A.2: Differences in means between Treated and Control groups. 
  Mean t-test 
  Treated Control [p-value] 
Unmatched sample 
% Vote turnout  0.541 0.654 4.25 [0.000] 
Income p.c.  0.947  0.939  1.09 [0.282] 
% Divorced  0.026  0.018  14.09 [0.000] 
% Graduate  0.106  0.077  12.57 [0.000] 
% Unemployment  0.147  0.143  0.88 [0.381] 
Ethnic diversity  0.060  0.035  10.83 [0.002] 
% Right voters  0.507  0.505  0.36 [0.724] 
log(Population)  9.610 8.182 27.31 [0.003] 
Matched sample 
% Vote turnout 0.708 0.692  -1.28 [0.202] 
Income p.c.  0.947 0.934  -0.79 [0.428] 
% Divorced  0.026 0.026 0.03 [0.976] 
% Graduate  0.114 0.104  -1.09 [0.278] 
% Unemployment  0.151 0.166 1.23 [0.220] 
Ethnic diversity  0.053 0.054 0.08 [0.932] 
% Right voters  0.219 0.218  -0.12 [0.908] 
log(Population)  9.788 9.678  -0.51 [0.610] 
Observations  122 97   
Note: (1) Treated group = municipalities where at least one corruption scandal 
was made public during the period 1999-2007; Control group=municipalities 
where no corruption scandals were made public during the same period. 
 
 
 
Table A.3.: Differences in means (survey observations). 
  Mean t-test 
  Treated Control [p-value] 
Turnout  0.833 0.846  -1.01 [0.220] 
Income 2.702 2.721 0.02 [0.479] 
Schooling 3.184 3.159 0.03 [0.700] 
Age  47.968 47.243 0.72 [0.260] 
Female 0.522 0.504 0.02 [0.225] 
Divorced 0.044 0.039 0.00 [0.424] 
Unemployed 0.130 0.140  -0.01 [0.327] 
Students 0.045 0.052  -0.01 [0.222] 
Retired 0.241 0.226 0.01 [0.283] 
Immigrants 0.039 0.031 0.01 [0.168] 
Ideology 1.841 1.817  0.02 [0.324] 
Independent 0.510 0.520  -0.01 [0.463] 
Incumbent core supporter 0.224 0.203 1.28 [0.200] 
Opposition core supporter 0.265 0.275  -0.01 [0.507] 
Interviewees per municipality 34.779 38.016  -1.18 [0.241] 
Number of municipalities  122 97   
Note: (1) Treated group = municipalities where at least one corruption scandal 
was made public during the period 1999-2007; Control group=municipalities 
where no corruption scandals were made public during the same period. 
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